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LAWYERS, GUNS, AND COMMERCE:
UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ AND THE NEW
COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
Interference with the power of the States was no constitutional cri-
terion of the power of Congress. If the power was not given, Con-
gress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, although




United States v. Lopez2 is the first United States Supreme Court
decision to strike down legislation based on the Commerce Clause
since National League of Cities v. Usery3 in 1976, which was overruled
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority4 in 1984.5
Previous to National League, the Court had not struck down legisla-
tion based upon the Commerce Clause since 1936 when it did so in
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,6 where the Court declared the establish-
ment of industrial codes of fair competition unconstitutional. After
President Roosevelt's "Court-packing" plan, Congress expanded na-
tional regulation based upon the Commerce Clause and the Court
1. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1897 (1791).
2. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
3. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
4. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
5. In National League, the Court struck down the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act ("FLSA") as being outside the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce
Clause because the amendments interfered with the states' freedom to structure employer-em-
ployee relationships in areas including fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, and public
health-areas which the Court termed "areas of traditional governmental functions." 426 U.S.
at 851-52. In Garcia, the Court overruled National League, held that the 1974 amendments to
FLSA were valid, and stated that the National League Court's attempt to draw the boundaries of
state regulatory immunity in terms of traditional governmental functions was "unsound in princi-
ple and unworkable in practice." 469 U.S. at 546. Because National League and Garcia involved
congressional efforts to regulate the states (thus triggering a Tenth Amendment analysis), these
two cases are distinguishable from United States v. Lopez which involved congressional efforts to
regulate the activity of private persons within the states. Jesse H. Choper, Did Last Term Reveal
"A Revolutionary States' Rights Movement Within the Supreme Court"?, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 663, 663 (1996). Therefore, in light of this distinction, this Note does not address National
League and Garcia in the background of case law leading up to the Lopez decision.
6. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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consistently upheld the legislation. 7 Statutes such as Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 19648 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act ("RICO"), 9 in particular, were major expansions of
federal regulation based upon the Commerce Clause.
The holding of Lopez signifies a limit to national regulation. It also
threatens a retreat to the dark ages of formalism which existed prior
to the New Deal. This formalism began in 1895 with United States v.
E.C. Knight Co.,1° in which the Court based its determination of what
constitutes "commerce" on whether the subject matter of regulation
was considered part of "production" or "manufacturing," as opposed
to "commerce." This retreat to formalism is surprising in light of the
history of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the Commerce Clause
jurisprudence leading up to Lopez."1 Part II provides a brief synopsis
of the facts and issues and conveys the Justices' varying points of view
in the Lopez decision.' 2 Part III then highlights lower court decisions
in the wake of Lopez.13 Part IV analyzes how the majority's narrow-
ing of the scope of the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the de-
velopment of the Commerce Clause jurisprudence.' 4 Finally, Part V
discusses the impact of the Lopez decision.15
I. BACKGROUND
In order to appreciate the importance of the Lopez decision, one
must first understand the origin of the definition of "commerce" and
the doctrines that emanated from that definition. In the first subsec-
tion, the definition of commerce is discussed. 16 In the second subsec-
tion, the author analyzes several doctrines which developed from the
late 1890s to the mid-1930s and the one doctrine that would ultimately
7. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CEN-
TURY, 1888-1986 235-36 (1990).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1991).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994).
10. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
11. See infra notes 16-110 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the Com-
merce Clause).
12. See infra notes 111-89 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the Lopez
decision).
13. See infra notes 190-244 and accompanying text (analyzing cases which have been decided
since Lopez).
14. See infra notes 245-368 and accompanying text (providing a critical analysis of the Lopez
decision).
15. See infra notes 369-84 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Lopez).
16. See infra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
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guide the Court's analysis of Commerce Clause cases for over half of a
century. 17
A. Gibbons v. Ogden and the Definition of Commerce
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress
the authority to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States.' 18
This phrase, however, was not interpreted until the decision of Gib-
bons v. Ogden in 1824.19 In Gibbons, Aaron Ogden, who held a New
York license to run a steamboat monopoly, brought an injunction pro-
ceeding against Thomas Gibbons, who held a license under federal
law to engage in coastal trade.20 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice
John Marshall originally defined interstate commerce as "intercourse"
based upon very broad grounds to enhance federal power.2' Chief
Justice Marshall conceded that "It]he completely internal commerce
of a State ... may be considered as reserved for the State itself."'22
However, he emphasized that "[c]ommerce among the States must, of
necessity, be commerce with the States. In the regulation of trade
with the Indian tribes, the action of the law, especially when the con-
stitution was made, was chiefly within a State."'2 3 Chief Justice Mar-
17. See infra notes 31-110 and accompanying text.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Robert Fulton acquired a monopoly under New York law to
run his steam-powered boats along the Hudson River. Id. at 6. While Aaron Ogden obtained a
Fulton license from New York, Thomas Gibbons had a federal license to run competing boats
under the Act of Feb. 18, 1793, c.8, I Stat. 305 (1793). Id. at 1-6.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 189-90. Chief Justice Marshall's famous definition outlined the parameters of
commerce:
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It de-
scribes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The
mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which
shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of
the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing
rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, or
of barter.
Id. According to Professor Laurence Tribe, under Chief Justice Marshall's definition of com-
merce, "Congress could legislate with respect to all 'commerce which concerns more state than
one."' LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 306 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting Gib-
bons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 95). Professor Tribe describes that Congress' power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause "would be plenary: absolute within its sphere, subject only to the
Constitution's affirmative prohibitions on the exercise of federal authority." Id. But see Richard
A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1402 (1987) (ex-
plaining that Chief Justice Marshall's definition of congressional power to regulate commerce in
Gibbons is not as expansive as Professor Tribe suggests).
22. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
23. Id. at 196.
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shall added that "[commerce among the States, cannot stop at the
external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the
interior. ' 24 Chief Justice Marshall did not define commerce narrowly,
such as defining commerce as any activity which crossed state lines.
Instead, he expanded the definition of commerce beyond the inclusion
of goods in trade to that of people and steamboats and the Court held
that Congress had the power to regulate navigation under the Com-
merce Clause.2 5
During the period between Gibbons and the enactment of the In-
terstate Commerce Act in 1887, the Court decided very few cases in-
volving congressional action.2 6 Most cases dealt with the validity of
state actions, which were purportedly in conflict with Congress' dor-
mant commerce power. 27 After the enactment of the Sherman Act in
1890,28 however, when the Court did review cases involving congres-
sional power, the Court did not utilize Chief Justice Marshall's expan-
sive and empirical definition of commerce. Instead, the Court created
new classifications of economic activity which reflected a more restric-
tive interpretation of the limits upon congressional power. 29 Through
these various tests, the Court sought to categorize whether commerce
was "local" or "interstate" in character.30
24. Id. at 194.
25. KERMIT L. HALL, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 337 (James J. Ely, Jr. et al. eds., 1992) (discussing Chief Justice Marshall's definition of
commerce).
26. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 306 (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 207-07. Because this Note does not focus on the dormant Commerce Clause power,
these cases will not be discussed. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (noting the
lack of cases involving the affirmative exercise of the commerce power during this period of
time). In the cases discussed in this Note, Congress affirmatively enacted a law under its Com-
merce Clause power. Cases involving the dormant commerce power are ones in which Congress
has not enacted a law, yet the Court holds that state regulations are either invalid because the
regulations interfere with interstate commerce or valid because the regulations are permissible
under the states' police power. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 406 (citing Willson v. Black-Bird Creek
Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) and Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102
(1837)).
28. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890).
29. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 307-08.
30. See infra notes 31 -110 and accompanying text (outlining the history of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
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B. The Development of Doctrinal Analysis Under the
Commerce Clause
1. Direct/Indirect Doctrine
The direct/indirect doctrine was the first formal approach to define
the activity which Congress could regulate. 31 In United States v. E.C.
Knight Co.,32 the "Sugar Trust Case," where the government brought
a civil suit against a sugar refining company for violating the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890,33 the Court held that by promulgating the Act
Congress exceeded its power to regulate manufacturing activities. 34
The Court categorized the activity of refining sugar as "precom-
merce," as contrasted with "commerce," which the Court defined as
buying, selling, and transporting goods. 35 In doing so, the Court lim-
ited the interstate commerce definition by adding a requirement that
the activity "directly" affect more than one state.36
Perhaps the most highly criticized decision utilizing the "direct/indi-
rect" doctrine developed in E.C. Knight was Hammer v. Dagenhart.37
In Hammer, the Court struck down a federal statute prohibiting pro-
ducers, manufacturers, and dealers from shipping products interstate
when the entity employed children under the age of sixteen within
thirty days prior to shipment. 38 While the Court recognized that the
statute's purpose was to protect children from being exploited in work
conditions, 39 it nevertheless utilized the formalistic approach and held
that the undesired use of child labor preceded shipping and could not
be categorized as commerce.40 The decision was especially surprising
31. See TRIBE, supra note 21, at 306-08.
32. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
33. Initially, the Court interpreted the Sherman Act to apply only if the defendant was en-
gaged in interstate commerce. BERNARD C. GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 204 (1932) (citing Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898)). How-
ever, in later cases, the Court construed the Act to make any action criminal which reasonably
could adversely affect those interested in interstate commerce. Id. at 205 (citing Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)).
34. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 10-13.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 12-13.
37. 247 U.S. 251 (1918); see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-21 457 n.140
(1984) (stating that Hammer was highly criticized by academics).
38. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268 n.1 (reprinting the first section of the Act).
39. Id. at 275 (pointing out that all would admit that there should be limitations upon the right
to employ children in mines and factories in the interest of the children and the public welfare).
40. Id. at 272 (emphasizing that the making of goods is not commerce and that the fact that
the goods would afterwards be shipped or used in interstate commerce does not make produc-
tion a part of commerce). According to one critic, the majority in Hammer reasoned that "Con-
gress could not, under its delegated power to regulate commerce, destroy commerce; nor could it
19971
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because the Court contemporaneously had developed the "injurious
to the public doctrine" which allowed Congress to regulate intrastate
activity to promote public morals. 41
In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,42 despite the
Roosevelt administration's attempt to remedy the results of the Great
Depression by regulating wage and hour requirements via the "Live
Poultry Code" of the National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"), 43
the Court used the direct/indirect test to strike down the NIRA. 44
Chief Justice Hughes refused to apply the "current of commerce" doc-
trine45 and stated that the sale of poultry was not a transaction in in-
terstate commerce because interstate transactions involving poultry
ended when the chickens reached local slaughterhouses.4 6 Chief Jus-
tice Hughes also rejected the use of the "affecting commerce" doc-
trine.4 7 He stated that because the sale of chicken to local dealers
only had an "indirect" effect on commerce, congressional regulation
of local slaughterhouses for selling unfit chickens to local dealers ex-
ceeded Congress' power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.48
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.49 the Court utilized the direct/indirect
doctrine to strike down another NIRA statute, the Bituminous Coal
by this indirect method impose its theories of sociology or public policy upon the several states."
Andrew A. Bruce, Interstate Commerce and Child-Labor, 3 MINN. L. REv. 89, 90 (1919). How-
ever, the minority espoused the view that Congress "may carry out its views of public policy
whatever indirect effect they may have upon the activities of the States .... The public policy of
the United States is shaped with a view to the benefit of the nation as a whole." Hammer, 247
U.S. at 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41. See CURRIE, supra note 7, at 96 (outlining the history surrounding Hammer); infra notes
69-80 and accompanying text (discussing the "injurious to the public" doctrine).
42. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
43. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
44. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 546-51.
45. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text (discussing the "current of commerce" test).
46. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 542-44 (finding that the undisputed facts of the case did not
warrant the argument that the poultry handled by the defendants at their slaughterhouse mar-
kets was in a "current" of interstate commerce).
47. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (analyzing the "close and substantial effect"
doctrine).
48. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 544-51. Chief Justice Hughes stated that to determine "how far the
federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the ground that they 'af-
fect' interstate commerce, there is a necessary and well-established distinction between direct
and indirect effects." Id. at 546. "The precise line can be drawn only as individual cases arise,
but the distinction is clear in principle." Id.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Cardozo stated that "[t]o find immediacy or directness here
is to find it almost everywhere. If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion of the
forces that oppose and counteract them, there will be an end to our federal system." Id. at 554
(Cardozo, J., concurring).
49. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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Conservation Act of 1935.50 The Court followed the holding of E.C.
Knight,51 which categorized the manufacture of coal as an activity
which preceded commerce and found that the activity only indirectly
affected commerce.52
2. "Close and Substantial Effect" Doctrine
In addition to the direct/indirect test, the Court developed another
test, the "close and substantial effect" test, which served to expand the
federal government's power. In Houston, East & West Texas Railway
Co. v. United States,53 the "Shreveport Rate Case," the Court upheld
an order given by the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"),
which required the Texas Railroad Commission to equalize Texas' in-
trastate rates. 54 The Court ruled that Congress could regulate intra-
state rates of interstate carriers and prescribe the "final and
dominant" rule55 because the intrastate rates of the railroad company
had such a "close and substantial effect" on interstate commerce that
the control of rates was essential or appropriate to the security of the
traffic. 56
At least one critic viewed Justice Hughes' majority opinion in the
Shreveport Rate Case as an attempt to limit the implication of its
holding to instrumentalities of commerce, such as railroads.57 How-
ever, in the Standard Oil case,58 the Court, in dismissing the conten-
tion that Congress' reach of authority did not extend to intrastate
50. Id. at 297-310. The Court discussed the underlying purposes of the statute as follows:
The purposes of the "Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935" ... are to stabilize
the bituminous coal-mining industry and promote its interstate commerce; to provide
for cooperative marketing of bituminous coal; to levy a tax on such coal and provide for
a drawback under certain conditions; to declare the production, distribution, and use of
such coal to be affected with a national public interest; to conserve the national re-
sources of such coal; to provide for the general welfare, and for other purposes.
Id. at 278.
51. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (analyzing the rationale employed by the
Court in E.C. Knight).
52. Carter, 298 U.S. at 300 (relying on Chief Justice Fuller's opinion in United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1895)). The Court's later decision in United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 115-23 (1941), explicitly overruled Hammer and limited the holding of Carter and im-
plicitly drove a nail into Schechter's coffin by upholding federal minimum wages for employees
engaged in production. See CURRIE, supra note 7, at 238 (providing a historical analysis of the
direct/indirect test).
53. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
54. See CURRIE, supra note 7, at 94 (discussing the "Shreveport Rate Case").
55. 234 U.S. at 343.
56. Id. (stating that Congress has a constitutional authority to regulate wherever interstate
and intrastate transactions are so related that one involves the control of the other).
57. CURRIE, supra note 7, at 95 (citation omitted).
58. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
1997]
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production of commodities, 59 clearly expanded the scope to articles of
commerce as well as instrumentalities of commerce. 60
3. The "Current of Commerce" Doctrine
After the turn of the century, and concurrent to its use of the for-
malistic categorization doctrine, the Court created yet another doc-
trine, the "current of commerce" test. In a case concerning the
intrastate sale of livestock and price fixing, Swift & Co. v. United
States,6' the Court took a pragmatic approach and unanimously re-
jected the local/national dichotomy of the previous tests stating that
"commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a
practical one, drawn from the course of business. '62 The Court ruled
that the sale of cattle by meat sellers who transported cattle between
states in the current of commerce was an incident of such commerce.63
In Stafford v. Wallace,64 a case involving the constitutionality of the
federal act which regulated intrastate activity of stockyards, the Court
held that Congress had the power to regulate such activity because
stockyards were the "throat through which the current [of commerce]
flow[ed]. ' 65 Signifying a retreat from the judicial review created in
Marbury v. Madison,66 the Court deferred to Congress when Chief
Justice Taft stated that it was "primarily for Congress to consider and
decide the fact of the danger and meet it"67 and that the Court would
"not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such a matter un-
less the relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect
upon it are clearly non-existent. '68
59. Id. at 68-69.
60. Id. The Court stated that the commerce/precommerce rationale of E.C. Knight was inap-
plicable to the case because it had been repeatedly and necessarily decided to be unsound. Id.
61. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
62. Id. at 398.
63. Id. at 398-99.
64. 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
65. Id. at 516. The Court indicated that sales are not merely local transactions and that sales
do not stop the current of commerce but, instead, are necessary factors in the middle of the
current of commerce. Id. at 518-19.
66. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the judiciary's power to review the constitution-
ality of laws enacted by Congress).
67. Stafford, 258 U.S. at 521-22 (noting that Congress' power to regulate must include the
authority to deal with acts which, because of their relation to and influence upon interstate
commerce, come within the power of Congress to regulate, although they are not interstate
commerce in and of themselves).
68. Id.
830 [Vol. 46:823
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4. The "Injurious to the Public" Doctrine
While the battle between the categorical tests ensued, the "injurious
to the public" doctrine developed, which increased Congress' ability
to regulate activity and created a national police power. Under this
doctrine, the Court upheld regulations that forbade the use of inter-
state commerce as a channel for transactions that menaced the na-
tional health, morals, or general welfare. 69 In Champion v. Ames, 7°
the "Lottery Case," the Court upheld a federal act that prohibited
shipping Paraguayan lottery tickets from Texas to California.7' The
Court held that regulation of interstate commerce necessarily in-
cluded prohibition of articles of commerce and reasoned that because
participation in lotteries was injurious to the morals of citizens, prohi-
bition fell within Congress' power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause.72 Although Champion argued that permitting the prohibition
of lottery tickets would lead to Congress' arbitrary exclusion of any
item from commerce, the Court noted that "the possible abuse of a
power ... [was] not an argument against its existence." 73
After deciding Champion, the Court upheld numerous other acts
using the same rationale. In Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States,74 the
Court upheld the Pure Food and Drugs Act which allowed a federal
agency to confiscate adulterated food which had been transported be-
tween states.75 In another case, Hoke v. United States,76 the Court
followed Champion in upholding the Mann Act which prohibited the
transportation of women and girls for immoral purposes.77 The Court
69. See Robert E. Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, 3 MINN. L. REv. 289, 381 (1919) (discussing in detail the development of the power
of Congress to regulate via police regulations).
70. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
71. Id. at 363.
72. Id. at 358-59 (emphasizing that Congress alone has the power to occupy, by legislation, the
entire field of interstate commerce).
73. Id. at 363 (explaining that "[t]here is probably no governmental power that may not be
exerted to the injury of the public"). In his majority opinion, Justice Harlan also quoted Chief
Justice Marshall's reasoning in Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824):
"The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the
influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other
instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have
relied, to secure them from abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must
often rely solely, in all representative governments."
Champion, 188 U.S. at 363.
74. 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
75. Id. at 58 (discussing Congress' discretion to not only prevent the physical movement of
adulterated articles but also to prevent the use of such articles denying them the facilities of
interstate commerce and seizing them at their point of destination).
76. 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
77. Id. at 326.
1997]
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noted that in Hipolite it rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that regula-
tion produced a clash of national legislation with the power of the
states. 78 Justice McKenna, writing for the majority in Hoke, stated:
Our dual form of government has its perplexities, State and Nation
having different spheres of jurisdiction, as we have said, but it must
be kept in mind that we are one people; and the powers reserved to
the States and those conferred on the Nation are adapted to be ex-
ercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the
general welfare, material and moral. 79
The broad strokes of Justice McKenna's words expanded the impact
of the Champion holding. The Court held that Congress had the
power to regulate and, therefore, prohibit interstate commerce not
only when the articles or transactions themselves are injurious to the
public health, morals, or safety, but also when such prohibition would
contribute substantially to the national welfare, regardless of the char-
acter of the subject matter being prohibited.80
5. Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan and the Development of the
"Substantial Effects" Doctrine
After two National Industrial Recovery Acts were struck down,81
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, frustrated and desperate, an-
nounced on February 5, 1937, his proposal to enlarge the Court from
nine to fifteen members, 82 questioning the capacity of aged judges and
reinforcing the need to appoint judges more sympathetic to his legisla-
78. Id. at 322-23.
79. Id. at 322.
80. Id. at 322-23; see Cushman, supra note 69, at 391-92 (surmising that Justice McKenna's
expansive view of congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce affected his decision
to join the dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)).
In 1925, the Court held that Congress could forbid interstate transportation of stolen cars in
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925). The Court reasoned that Congress could use its
police power via the Commerce Clause to prevent the use of such commerce as an agency to
promote immorality, dishonesty, or the spread of evil or harm. Id. at 436. The Court also stated
that it would not "help to conceal the trail of the thieves." Id. According to one commentator,
Chief Justice Taft misapplied the holding of Hammer in Brooks because he only argued "that
interstate transportation encouraged auto theft-the very argument that he [Chief Justice Taft]
acknowledged had been held insufficient in Hammer. He [Chief Justice Taft] made no effort to
show that stolen cars were harmful to anyone in the state to which they were transported."
CURRIE, supra note 7, at 175-76 (citing Brooks, 267 U.S. at 438-39).
81. The Live Poultry Act was struck down in 1935 in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act was struck down in 1936 in
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
82. Under the President's proposal, one new judge would be appointed for each member of
the Court who reached the age of seventy, sat for ten years, and did not resign or retire within six
months after reaching the age of seventy. See RETIREMENT OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, S.
REP. No. 75-119, at 1 (1937).
[Vol. 46:823
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tive program.83 One commentator has argued that Roosevelt's Court-
packing plan, had it been successfully implemented, would have ulti-
mately diluted the votes of uncooperative Justices and would have
drastically weakened the Court's ability to enforce the Constitution
against other branches.84 Two years after his Court-packing plan was
rejected, President Roosevelt claimed that he had "lost the battle but
won the war."'85 Indeed, it was only after Roosevelt's proposal that
the Court rejected the formal categorization doctrine which had been
utilized to strike down so many federal statutes.86
The first case which reflected this change was NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. ,87 in which the Court faced the issue of whether
Congress could regulate the labor practices of manufacturers.8 8 In
holding that Congress could, the Court notably rejected the formalis-
tic categorization of the "direct/indirect" test.89 For the first time, the
Court actually relied on statistics in its analysis of whether Congress
could conclude that labor practices could have an effect on interstate
commerce.90 The Court emphasized that a direct effect was the
equivalent of a practical effect.91 This decision marked the beginning
of the movement toward the "aggregate effects" test.92
The second case that was decided after the failed Court-packing
plan and served to punctuate the end of formalistic categorization was
United States v. Darby.93 In Darby, where a lumber manufacturer
challenged the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 94 the
83. See CURRIE, supra note 7, at 235 (explaining that President Roosevelt made no secret of
his real purpose); see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123 (12th ed. 1991) (quot-
ing President Roosevelt's message to Congress).
84. CURRIE, supra note 7, at 235 n.159.
85. GUNTHER, supra note 83, at 124.
86. Id.
87. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
88. Id. at 29-30.
89. Id. at 39 (refusing to apply the commerce/precommerce rationale used in United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)).
90. The Court analyzed the statistics of activities of the entire steel industry to emphasize the
practical effect of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation's labor practices on commerce: "33,000
men mine ore, 44,000 men mine coal, 4,000 men quarry limestone, 16,000 men manufacture
coke, 343,000 men manufacture steel, and 83,000 men transport its product. Respondent has
about 10,000 employees in its Aliquippa plant, which is located in a community of about 30,000
persons." Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 27.
91. Chief Justice Hughes emphasized that "[i]t is the effect upon commerce, not the source of
the injury, which is the criterion." Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
92. GUNTHER, supra note 83, at 124-31.
93. 312 U.S. 100 (1940).
94. Id. at 111-12. More specifically, the manufacturer challenged: (1) the prohibition of the
interstate shipment of lumber manufactured by employees making less than the prescribed mini-
mum wage or working more than the prescribed maximum number of hours at the prescribed
wage; and (2) the prohibition of employing workmen in the production of goods for interstate
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Court sustained the federal power to regulate the production of goods
for commerce.95 The Darby decision explicitly overruled Hammer v.
Dagenhart96 and explicitly limited the holding in Carter v. Carter Coal
Co.,97 thereby finally making the old "manufacturing versus com-
merce" dichotomy irrelevant. 98 Darby reaffirmed the deference given
to Congress in previous cases, including Hoke v. United States,99 by
holding that "[t]he motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate
commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise
of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the
courts are given no control." 100
It was the third case, Wickard v. Filburn,10 ' however, which would
set the standard of judicial review for congressional regulation of in-
terstate and intrastate commerce for almost five and a half decades. 10 2
In Wickard, the Court utilized the rational basis scrutiny laid out in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.103 and held that Congress
could regulate a farmer's production of wheat for personal consump-
tion because, in the aggregate, such activity could affect the supply
and demand for wheat.'0 4 The Court stated that the fact that the indi-
vidual's activity alone seemed trivial was not enough to protect his
activity from federal regulation.10 5 Wickard also reaffirmed the con-
commerce who did not make the prescribed minimum wage or worked more than the prescribed
maximum number of hours. Id. at 108.
95. Id. at 121-24.
96. 247 U.S. 251 (1918); see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing Hammer).
97. 298 U.S. 238 (1936); see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing Carter).
98. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17, 123 (1941); see CURRIE, supra note 7, at 238
(indicating that several decisions confirmed that "the game was over").
99. 227 U.S. 308 (1913); see supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing Hoke).
100. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115 (citing McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904) and Sonzinsky
v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937)). "The judicial cannot prescribe to the legislative depart-
ment of the government limitations upon the exercise of its acknowledged power." Id. (citing
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 68 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869)).
101. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
102. Court decisions concerning congressional regulation of interstate and intrastate com-
merce between Wickard in 1942 and Lopez in 1995 primarily utilized "rational basis" scrutiny.
See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (using rational basis
scrutiny to uphold the Fair Labor Standards Act and rejecting the unworkable "traditional gov-
ernmental function" test of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (vali-
dating Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act which made it a crime to conduct loan-
sharking activities); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards
Act); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of Congress' power).
103. 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (discussing Jones &
Laughlin Steel).
104. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28 (explaining the "aggregate effect" test).
105. Id.
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cept that Congress may regulate wholly intrastate activities which
have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce and rejected the
categorization of activity as being either "local" or "national."' 10 6 Af-
ter Wickard, the Court used the "substantial effects" doctrine com-
bined with rational basis scrutiny to uphold numerous congressional
regulations based upon the Commerce Clause, including the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,107 the Consumer Credit
Protection Act,108 Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,109 and the
Fair Labor Standards Act." 0
II. SUBJECT OPINION
A. Facts
On March 10, 1992, school officials at Edison High School in San
Antonio, Texas, received an anonymous tip that a twelfth-grade stu-
dent named Alphonso Lopez possessed a handgun in school that
day."' When the school policeman asked Lopez about the gun, Lo-
pez admitted that he had a gun. 112 Officials found an unloaded, .38-
caliber handgun in his waistband and five cartridges in his pocket. 1 3
Lopez explained to a San Antonio police officer that he was holding
the items during the school day for delivery to a third person after
school for use in a gang war.114 Lopez would have received forty dol-
lars from the third person for the gun and his services." 5
Lopez was arrested and charged with violating a federal statute, sec-
tion 922(q)(2)(A) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which
forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that
106. Id. at 119-20 (dismissing distinctions between "local" and "national" activity in prior de-
cisions as being mere dicta).
107. Hodel, 452 U.S. 264.
108. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
109. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); cf Perez, 402 U.S. at 153-54 (explaining that in Heart of Atlanta and
McClung, the Court implemented the "class of activities" test to sustain acts of Congress holding
that where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power,
the courts have no power to trivialize individual instances of the class). But Cf. CURRIE, supra
note 7, at 425 (criticizing the Court and stating that "[s]ustaining federal prohibition of discrimi-
nation in hotels, restaurants, and other 'public accommodations' under the commerce power
required the Court only to construct more of those embarrassing for-want-of-a-nail causal
chains").
110. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1984).
111. Brief for Respondent, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.; United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993).
115. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345.
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the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone." 116 The statute provided that:
[t]he term 'firearm' means (A) any weapon (including a starter gun)
which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a
projectile by the action of an explosive; (B) the frame or receiver of
any such weapon; (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or
(D) any destruction device. Such term does not include an antique
firearm. 17
The term "school" means "a school which provides elementary or
secondary education, as determined under State law." 118 In addition,
Congress defined "school zone" as "in, or on the grounds of, a public,
parochial or private school" or "within a distance of 1,000 feet from
the grounds of a public, parochial or private school."'119
116. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1994). Subsequent to the Lopez trial, Congress amended sec-
tion 922(q) to include findings that:
(A) crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive, nationwide
problem;
(B) crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of drugs, guns,
and criminal gangs;
(C) firearms and ammunition move easily in interstate commerce and have been found
in increasing numbers in and around schools, as documented in numerous hearings in
both the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives and Judiciary Commit-
tee of the Senate;
(D) in fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component parts, ammunition,
and the raw materials from which they are made have considerably moved in interstate
commerce;
(E) while criminals freely move from State to State, ordinary citizens and foreign visi-
tors may fear to travel to or through certain parts of the country due to concern about
violent crime and gun violence, and parents may decline to send their children to school
for the same reason;
(F) the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a decline in the
quality of education in our country;
(G) this decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact on interstate com-
merce and the foreign commerce of the United States;
(H) States, localities, and school systems find it almost impossible to handle gun-related
crime by themselves; even States, localities, and school systems that have made strong
efforts to prevent, detect, and punish gun-related crime find their efforts unavailing due
in part to the failure or inability of other States or localities to take strong measures;
and
(I) Congress has power, under the interstate commerce clause and other provisions of
the Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the integrity and safety of the Nation's
schools by enactment of this subsection.
Id. § 922(q)(1).
117. Id. § 921(a)(3).
118. Id. § 921(a)(26).
119. Id. § 921(a)(25). Section 922 (q)(2)(B) states that:
Subparagraph(A) shall not apply to the possession of a firearm-
(i) on private property not part of school grounds;
(ii) if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do so by the State in which the
school zone is located or a political subdivision of the State, and the law of the State or
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B. Procedural History
During the district court proceedings, Lopez, the respondent, made
a motion to dismiss on the ground that section 922(q) was unconstitu-
tional, arguing that it was beyond the power of Congress to legislate
control over public schools. 120 The district court, however, denied the
motion.12' Lopez then waived his right to a jury trial and the court
conducted a bench trial and convicted Lopez. 122 The court held that
section 922(q) was a valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate ac-
tivities in and affecting commerce and that the "business" of elemen-
tary, middle, and high schools affected interstate commerce. 2 3
Lopez appealed his conviction on the grounds that section 922(q)
"in the full reach of its terms,... [was] invalid as beyond the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause.' 2 4 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed the conviction.125 Because of
the importance of determining the scope of the Commerce Clause, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2 6
The issue before the Court was whether the federal Gun-Free
School Zones Act affected interstate commerce so as to be a proper
exercise of congressional power to legislate under the Commerce
political subdivision requires that, before an individual obtain such a license, the law
enforcement authorities of the State or political subdivision verify that the individual is
qualified under law to receive the license;
(iii) which is-
(I) not loaded; and
(II) in a locked container, or a locked firearms rack which is on a motor vehicle;
(iv) by an individual for use in a program approved by a school in the school zone;
(v) by an individual in accordance with a contract entered into between a school in the
school zone and the individual or an employer of the individual;
(vi) by a law enforcement officer acting in his or her official capacity; or
(vii) that is unloaded and is possessed by an individual while traversing school premises
for the purpose of gaining access to public or private lands open to hunting, if the entry
on school premises is authorized by school authorities.
Id. § 922(q)(2)(B).
120. Brief for Respondent, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
121. Id.
122. Id. (explaining that Lopez was sentenced to six months of imprisonment, two years of
supervised release, and a fifty-dollar special assessment fine).
123. Brief for the United States, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
124. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Brief for Respon-
dent, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260) (LEXIS, Genfed Library,
Briefs File) (stating the Fifth Circuit's rationale for reversal).
125. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1342.
126. United States v. Lopez, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994) (granting certiorari); see also United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (relating the importance of granting certiorari).
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Clause.127 A bare majority of the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's
ruling and struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act as being be-
yond Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.128
C. The Supreme Court's Opinion
Each Justice who wrote an opinion (except for Justice Stevens) out-
lined the Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 129 Because each Justice in-
terpreted the history of the Commerce Clause in a different way, this
section divides the opinions of the majority and the dissenting justices
and discusses each analysis individually.
1. The Majority Opinion
a. Chief Justice Rehnquist
In writing the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist reviewed
the evolution of the Commerce Clause and posited that in the past,
Congress had been permitted to regulate only where the subject mat-
ter of the regulation involved three categories: 130 (1) the use of the
channels of interstate commerce;' 3' (2) the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities; 132 and (3)
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 133
Chief Justice Rehnquist, with little discussion, decided that section
922(q)(2)(A) did not fit into the first or second categories, thereby
defining the issue as whether the possession of a gun in school had a
"substantial relation to interstate commerce. '"134 The majority distin-
127. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (reiterating the issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit and an-
nouncing the Court's affirmance).
128. Id. at 1634.
129. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice O'Connor joined,
wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justices Stevens and
Souter wrote separate dissenting opinions. Justice Breyer, with whom Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg joined, wrote a dissenting opinion.
130. Id. at 1629 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 50 (1971) and Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981)).
131. Id. (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 150 (1941) and Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 241, 256 (1964)).
132. Id. (citing as an example Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342
(1914) (the "Shreveport Rate Case")).
133. Id. at 1630 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
134. Id. (disposing of the first two categories while admitting that in addressing the third cate-
gory, "case law has not been clear whether an activity must 'affect' or 'substantially affect' inter-
state commerce in order to be within Congress' power to regulate it under the Commerce
Clause").
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guished Wickard v. Filburn,135 in which the Court held that a farmer's
activity of growing wheat for personal consumption substantially af-
fected interstate commerce in the aggregate.1 36 The Court did so by
noting that while the Agricultural Adjustment Act at issue in Wickard
regulated the volume of wheat moving in interstate commerce, the
Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez "ha[d] nothing to do
with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly
one might define those terms. '137
The majority opinion held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did
not contain any jurisdictional element which would serve to limit the
Act's reach to a narrow set of firearm possessions that has a sufficient
nexus with commerce.1 38 Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to defer to
Congress, 39 thereby rejecting the argument that Congress had exper-
tise regarding the nexus between firearms and interstate commerce as
demonstrated by previous statutory enactments.1 40 Although he ad-
mitted that Congress was not required to make findings as to the bur-
den that an activity has on interstate commerce, the Chief Justice
stated that findings would enable the Court to evaluate a legislature's
judgment that the proscribed activity substantially affected interstate
commerce, especially where no such substantial effect was "visible to
the naked eye. '141
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected the argu-
ments that possession of a gun in school impacted the U.S. economy
by (1) resulting in a significant nationwide cost of insurance associated
135. 317 U.S. 111 (1938).
136. Id. at 128-29.
137. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. The majority urged that the states possess primary author-
ity for defining and enforcing criminal law. Id.
138. Id. at 1631. A jurisdictional element is language that limits the scope of a statute to
activity that is in commerce or affecting commerce. Cf. id. Chief Justice Rehnquist compared
the statute in Lopez, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), with the statute in question in United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971). According to the Chief Justice, the Bass Court held that the statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1202(a), which prohibited a felon "to receive[], possess[], or transport[] in commerce or af-
fecting commerce ... any firearm," required an additional nexus to interstate commerce because
it was ambiguous and because Congress must clearly state when it changes the federal-state
balance. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (citing Bass, 404 U.S. 336).
139. Although the Chief Justice mentioned the "clear statement" rule by which he could have
avoided the constitutional issue, he spent a mere paragraph discussing this point. Lopez, 115 S.
Ct. at 1631. The "clear statement" rule is a rule of statutory interpretation that "unless Congress
conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state
balance." Bass, 404 U.S. at 349. The Court's reluctance to apply this rule arguably signified the
Court's desire to base its rationale on broader, constitutional grounds.
140. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. The Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that reliance on previ-
ous findings to justify section 922(q) was inappropriate because prior congressional findings did




with violent crime, (2) harming the economy by limiting the willing-
ness of individuals to travel to areas that are believed to be unsafe, or
(3) posing a serious threat to the educated citizenry supporting the
nation's work force. 142 Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that if the
Court accepted the chain of causality upon which these rationales
were based and deferred to Congress as the Court had in the past,
there would be no activity that Congress could not regulate. 143 Fi-
nally, to drive the point home, and to seemingly chastise Congress for
its legislative overreaching, the Chief Justice quoted Marbury v.
Madison,144 to remind Congress that it is the judiciary's duty "to say
what the law is.' 45
b. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice O'Connor joined, began his
concurrence by outlining the evolution of the Commerce Clause. 146
In reviewing the Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy
conceded that content-based boundaries, such as defining whether
something was "commerce" or "not commerce," if used without more,
were imprecise.147 However, Justice Kennedy argued that Congress
had tipped the scales and that it was the judiciary's duty to ensure that
the federal-state balance was not destroyed. 148 According to Justice
Kennedy, federalism ruled the day;149 if the Court did not strike down
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, it would be sanctioning congres-
sional intrusion on state sovereignty and foreclosing the states from
"experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which
States lay claim by right of history and expertise.' u50 According to
142. Id. at 1632-33.
143. Id. at 1632. The majority stated that "[i]t is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically
have been sovereign." Id.; see also Official Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260), 1994 WL 758950, at *18-19 (proposing that exercising def-
erence to Congress has the consequence of relying on Congress to preserve the federal
structure).
144. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
145. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
146. Id. at 1634-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 1637. Justice Kennedy asserted that the history of Commerce Clause decisions
should provide a lesson in the futility of content-based boundaries to define the limits of the
Commerce Clause. Id.
148. Id. at 1639-40.
149. Id. at 1638. Justice Kennedy argued that "[wiere the federal government to take over the
regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern .... the boundaries between the sphere of
federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory." Id.
150. Id. at 1641. Justice Kennedy also indicated that with over 100,000 elementary and secon-
dary schools in the United States, it would be "difficult to navigate" through those school zones
without infringing upon an area of federal jurisdiction. Id.
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Justice Kennedy, the Act was an interference imposed by Congress on
state sovereignty. 151 In turn, this interference contradicted the federal
balance that the Framers designed and that the Court was obligated to
enforce.152
c. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, concentrated on the "original
understanding" of the Commerce Clause and how far the Court had
departed from that understanding. 153 First, Justice Thomas returned
to the eighteenth century to define "commerce" as "selling, buying,
bartering as well as transporting for such purposes."'1 54 Second, Jus-
tice Thomas relied upon Gibbons v. Ogden1 55 to analyze what was
meant by "commerce among the several states."'1 56 To Justice
Thomas, the Gibbons holding meant that although the line between
intrastate and interstate commerce would be difficult to draw, federal
authority could not be construed to include purely intrastate com-
merce. 157 Commerce that did not affect another state could never be
said to be commerce "among the several states.' 58 Thus, because Al-
phonso Lopez' gun possession in school did not "affect" another state,
Justice Thomas concluded that the Gun-Free School Zones Act ex-
ceeded the authority of Congress to regulate commerce.' 59 According
to Justice Thomas, Lopez signified a long-awaited return to the "origi-
nal understanding" of Congress' Commerce Clause power after sixty
years of misinterpretation. 60
2. The Dissent
a. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens, in his brief dissent, stated that the majority's hold-
ing was a radical departure from the status quo'because in the previ-
ous sixty years the Court had deferred to Congress regarding
151. Id. at 1642.
152. Id.
153. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 1643.
155. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text (discussing the
holding of Gibbons).
156. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
157. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1647-48 (Thomas, J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1643. Justice Thomas emphasized that the result reached by the majority was by
"no means radical." Id.
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Congress' exercise of the Commerce Clause power. 161 In addition,
Justice Stevens stressed that guns are an instrument of commerce and
may be used to restrain commerce.' 62 Therefore, Justice Stevens be-
lieved that Congress had a duty to regulate the possession of guns,
which included prohibition of the possession of guns. 163 Although the
majority quickly excluded section 922(q) from the first two categories
of subject matter that Congress has authority to regulate, Justice Ste-
vens unfortunately did not expound upon his criticisms of this hasty
dismissal.I 64
b. Justice Souter
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter criticized the majority for
its lack of judicial restraint.165 According to Justice Souter, judicial
review of congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause in-
volves deference to an "implicit congressional judgment that its regu-
lation addresses a subject substantially affecting interstate commerce
'if there is any rational basis for such a finding. ' "1 66 Justice Souter
noted that under rational basis scrutiny, the majority's formalistic
"commerce" versus "noncommerce" categorization was reminiscent
of the pre-New Deal years and should not have had any bearing on
the outcome.' 67 In addition, Justice Souter averred that the majority's
emphasis on whether gun possession was a subject of traditional state
regulation was misplaced.' 68 Finally, Justice Souter argued that the
majority's requirement that the statute contain explicit factual find-
ings that the regulated activity substantially affect interstate com-
merce could not square with rational basis scrutiny.' 69 Thus, Justice
161. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens, the character of the
majority's holding was similar to the discredited version of due process which required a person




165. Id. at 1651-52 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that "[t]he modem respect
for the competence and primacy of Congress in matters affecting commerce developed only after
one of this Court's most chastening experiences, when it perforce repudiated an earlier and
untenably expansive conception of judicial review in derogation of congressional commerce
power." Id. at 1652.
166. Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
276 (1981)).
167. Id. at 1653-54. In addition, Justice Souter criticized the majority for using a sliding scale
of deference according to the commercial or noncommercial nature of proscribed activity being
regulated. Id.
168. Id. at 1654.
169. Id. at 1655-56.
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Souter believed that the Gun-Free School Zones Act clearly passed
rational basis scrutiny. 170
c. Justice Breyer
According to Justice Breyer's dissent,171 the Gun-Free School
Zones Act was within the scope of the Commerce Clause and was
fully consistent with the past fifty years of Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. 172 Justice Breyer determined that the true issue in this case
was whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that the gun-
related school violence had a sufficient impact on interstate com-
merce. 73 A rational basis scrutiny did not require specific congres-
sional findings that there was an interstate commerce effect. 174 Justice
Breyer emphasized that Congress could have rationally found a rela-
tionship between violence in schools and interstate commerce because
guns in schools significantly undermine the quality of education
which, in turn, affects economic productivity and competitiveness. 175
In support of this argument, Justice Breyer offered violence-related,
educational, and economic statistics to prove that Congress could
have found the correlation between guns and commerce. 176
Justice Breyer also discussed three legal problems with the major-
ity's reasoning. First, according to Justice Breyer, the majority's hold-
ing ran contrary to modern Court cases that have upheld
congressional actions despite rather tenuous connections to interstate
commerce that have a less significant effect than school violence. 177
In support of this argument, Justice Breyer cited Perez v. United
States,178 in which the Court upheld a federal statute that made purely
170. Id. at 1657. Justice Souter characterized the Lopez case as being a misstep and not an
epochal case. Id.
171. Justices Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's dissent. Id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1659.
174. See id. at 1658 ("There is no special need here for a clear indication of Congress' ration-
ale."). Justice Breyer argued that a clear statement of congressional findings would only serve to
determine Congress' intended result and that there was "no doubt as to which activities Con-
gress intended to regulate" with the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Id. at 1659.
175. Id. at 1659-62.
176. Justice Breyer stated that "in any 6-month period, several hundred-thousand schoolchil-
dren are victims of violent crimes in or near their schools." Id. at 1659 (citing Children and
Guns: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 101st Cong. 15
(1989)). Justice Breyer also noted that there is an empirical link between school violence and
dropout rates. Id. (citing Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 44 (1990)).
177. Id. at 1662.
178. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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intrastate, extortionate credit transactions a federal crime. 179 Further,
Justice Breyer noted that the Court upheld a statute that prohibited
racial discrimination at local restaurants in part because it affected
purchases of restaurant supplies from other states in Katzenbach v.
McClung.180 Finally, Justice Breyer discussed Wickard v. Filburn,181 in
which the Court upheld an act that prohibited a farmer from produc-
ing wheat grown and consumed on his own local farm and emphasized
that it was the aggregate effect on commerce (if all farmers were to
produce wheat for their personal consumption), not an individual act
in isolation, which was dispositive. 182 Justice Breyer argued that based
on the statistics he cited,183 violence in schools has had a greater affect
on interstate commerce than the activities that were deemed to affect
interstate commerce in Perez, Katzenbach, and Wickard.184
The second legal problem in the majority's opinion, according to
Justice Breyer, was the distinction that the majority made between
"commercial" and "noncommercial" transactions. 185 Quoting Justice
Holmes, Justice Breyer reasoned that "commerce among the States is
not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the
course of business.' 86 Justice Breyer argued that Congress could
have rationally concluded that schools fell on the commercial side of
the line since Congress treated primary and secondary schools as a
$230-billion-dollar business when allocating resources. 87
The third legal defect in the majority's opinion to which Justice
Breyer alluded was that the decision issued in Lopez produced "legal
uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case, seemed reasonably
well settled.' 88 According to Justice Breyer, this legal uncertainty re-
179. Id. at 157. In particular, the intrastate transaction in Perez involved the defendant's ad-
vance of money to the victim, after which the defendant threatened to castrate the victim and
put him in the hospital. Id. at 147-48.
180. 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964).
181. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
182. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text (analyzing Wickard and its progeny).
183. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (describing the statistics upon which Justice
Breyer relied).
184. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1662-63 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Disagree-
ing with the majority, Justice Breyer emphasized that "[ilt is enough that the individual activity
when multiplied into a general practice . . . contains a threat to the interstate economy that
requires preventative regulation." Id. at 1663 (citing Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905)).
187. Id. at 1664. Justice Breyer further explained that the business of schools requires spend-
ing funds on transportation, food, custodial services, books, and teachers' salaries. Id.
188. Id. In addition, Justice Breyer noted that Congress had enacted more than one hundred
sections of the United States Code, including at least twenty-five sections that use the words
"affecting commerce" to define their scope. Id.
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stricted Congress' ability to enact criminal laws aimed at behavior that
seriously threatened economic harm.1 89 Because of these three
problems with the majority's rationale, Justice Breyer would have re-
versed the Fifth Circuit's ruling and upheld the Gun-Free School
Zones Act.
III. POsT-LoPEz CASES
Although lower courts have applied the Lopez holding in a variety
of contexts, 190 no uniform doctrine has emerged from the Lopez deci-
sion. For this reason, this section divides representative cases accord-
ing to the three rationales used by lower courts, including: (1)
categorization of the prohibited items as "things in commerce," (2)
deference to explicit jurisdictional elements and explicit congressional
findings of a nexus between the proscribed activity and interstate
commerce, and (3) whether the person or entity committing the pro-
hibited activity was "engaged in interstate commerce" because he or
she purchased or had the ability to purchase supplies from out of
state.
A. Categorization of Prohibited Items as "Things in Commerce"
In the following cases, the courts seem to dodge the question of
whether possession of prohibited items substantially affects interstate
commerce by thrusting the activity at issue into Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's second category: persons or things in interstate commerce. 191
The courts' rationale in these cases seem to fill in the gaps of what
Justice Stevens omitted in his dissenting opinion. 192
In United States v. Mosby,193 the Eighth Circuit upheld a federal
ammunition statute 194 and ruled that a felon's possession in Minne-
sota of cartridges which were assembled in Minnesota was also posses-
sion of individual components which were items in interstate
189. Id. at 1665. Justice Breyer also questioned the validity of Wickard in light of the major-
ity's increased scrutiny of Congress' regulation. Id.
190. The post-Lopez Commerce Clause cases involve a variety of federal criminal laws regu-
lating intrastate possession, including but not limited to 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994) (regulating
arson); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994) (regulating the possession of firearms by felons); 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(o) (1994) (regulating the possession of machine guns); and 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (1994) (reg-
ulating the possession of controlled substances).
191. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
192. Although Justice Stevens mentioned briefly that the Gun-Free School Zones Act regu-
lated articles or things in commerce, he did not provide a detailed analysis.. Id. at 1651 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); see supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens'
dissent).
193. 60 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 938 (1996).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
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commerce. 95 Although the Eighth Circuit recognized that the Lopez
decision narrowed Congress' power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause, it held that Congress' power was still broad enough to justify
the validity of section 922(g)(1).196
In United States v. Kirk,197 the Fifth Circuit held that a federal stat-
ute t98 prohibiting the possession of post-1986 machine guns did not
violate the Commerce Clause. 199 According to the Fifth Circuit, Lo-
pez was not controlling because unlike section 922(q), the machine
gun statute at issue embodied a proper exercise of Congress' power to
regulate "things in interstate commerce. '200 The court championed
Congress' power to decide whether it was necessary to control intra-
state activity in order to curb interstate activity. 20'
B. Deference to Congress To Determine Nexus
Most of the post-Lopez cases address this category, which may sig-
nify that this area contains the most unanswered questions regarding
adjudication of the proper scope of the Commerce Clause. The cases
fit into three categories: (1) those cases in which the court declares
that a statute has a jurisdictional element, thereby ending the Com-
merce Clause analysis; 20 2 (2) those cases in which the court looks for a
jurisdictional element and, if the element is not apparent, defers to
explicit congressional findings determining that the nexus is ade-
quate;203 and (3) those cases in which the court makes its own deter-
195. United States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454, 457 (8th Cir. 1995).
196. Id. at 456. Congress' "power remains broad enough to support application of § 922(g)(1)
in this case." Id.
197. 70 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1995).
198. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o).
199. Kirk, 70 F.3d at 795-96 (5th Cir. 1995) (following the holding of United States v. Wilks,
58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995)).
200. Id.
201. The subject of federal machine-gun laws was mentioned during the oral argument of
Lopez. Official Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)
(No. 93-1260), 1994 WL 758950, at *32-33. One of the Justices asked Mr. Carter, counsel for the
respondent, whether a federal law, exactly the same as the one at issue in Lopez with the excep-
tion that the term "firearm" was replaced with "machine gun or explosive device," would be a
valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Id. Mr. Carter re-
plied, "Absent some finding by Congress linking it to its commerce power-" and the Justice
interrupted by saying, "It would be the same case." Id. at *33.
202. United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 966
(1996); United States v. Shelton, 66 F.3d 991, 992 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1364
(1996).
203. Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1507-08 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sherlin,
67 F.3d 1208, 1213-14 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112 (4th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568, 571 (D. Kan. 1995).
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mination and does not defer to Congress because there is no nexus to
support a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 20 4
1. Jurisdictional Element Triggers Deference to Congress
Two cases in which a court automatically deferred to Congress after
finding a jurisdictional element in the statute are United States v. Bol-
ton205 and United States v. Shelton.20 6 Both Bolton and Shelton in-
volved defendants who were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),
which prohibits felons from possessing firearms.20 7 In Bolton and
Shelton, the respective courts held that the jurisdictional element re-
quiring that the firearms were shipped, transported, or possessed "in
or affecting" interstate commerce ensured that the firearm possession
in question affected interstate commerce. 208 Neither court questioned
Congress' determination of the nexus between felons possessing fire-
arms and interstate commerce and neither court attempted to explain
the connection;20 9 both courts merely deferred to Congress upon a
finding of a jurisdictional element.210
2. When Jurisdictional Element Is Not Present, the Plain Meaning
of the Statute or Congressional Findings of an Interstate-
Commerce Nexus Triggers Deference
Where no jurisdictional element exists, the plain language of the
statute may determine whether a jurisdictional element may be in-
ferred from the language itself.211 In addition, where no jurisdictional
element exists, whether Congress made explicit findings of a nexus to
interstate commerce may also be determinative.212
204. United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 528 (9th Cir. 1995).
205. 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995).
206. 66 F.3d 991 (8th Cir. 1995).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994).
208. See Bolton, 68 F.3d at 400 (stating that "[s]ection 922(g)'s requirement that the firearm
have been, at some time, in interstate commerce is sufficient to establish its constitutionality
under the Commerce Clause"); Shelton, 66 F.3d at 992 (stating that the defendant admitted that
the particular firearms at some point traveled in interstate commerce because firearms were no
longer manufactured in the state in which he was convicted).
209. Bolton, 68 F.3d at 400; Shelton, 66 F.3d at 992.
210. Bolton, 68 F.3d at 400; Shelton, 66 F.3d at 992.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568, 571-72 (D. Kan. 1995) (up-
holding the Drug-Free School Zones Act by inferring from the language "intent to distribute" a
jurisdictional element linking drug possession to commerce).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that congres-
sional findings that controlling intrastate possession of drugs was necessary to control interstate
commerce were dispositive).
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In United States v. Garcia-Salazar,213 the defendant was charged
with possession with intent to distribute marijuana within 1,000 feet of
an elementary school,214 a violation of the Drug-Free School Zones
Act.215 The court upheld the constitutionality of the Drug-Free
School Zones Act by distinguishing its language from the Gun-Free
School Zones Act that the Supreme Court had struck down in Lo-
pez.2 16 Although the Drug-Free School Zones Act was similar to
Gun-Free School Zones Act in that it did not have a jurisdictional
element requiring proof of a nexus with interstate commerce, the Gar-
cia-Salazar court observed that, unlike the firearms statute, the Drug-
Free School Zones Act did not criminalize mere possession of drugs
but only possession with the intent to distribute.217
The court stated that drug possession with the intent to distribute
was inherently commercial in nature, while firearm possession was
not.21 8 It is arguable that Lopez's firearm possession, although not
inherently commercial, became commercial when Lopez possessed
the gun with the intent to deliver and sell the gun at his high school. 219
However, section 922(q) contained no provision under which Lopez
could have been charged with possession with intent to deliver a
firearm.220
In contrast to the firearm possession in Lopez, the court in Garcia-
Salazar also held that possession of drugs in school with the intent to
distribute was an economic activity that, through repetition elsewhere;
substantially affected interstate commerce. 221 This, ironically, is remi-
niscent of the Wickard aggregate-effect test that was abandoned by
213. 891 F. Supp. 568 (D. Kan. 1995).
214. Id. at 568.
215. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (1994). The Act states:
Any person who violates section 841(a)(1) ... or section 856 ... by distributing, pos-
sessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or
within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elemen-
tary, vocational, or secondary school or a public or private college, junior college, or
university, or a playground, or housing facility owned by a public housing authority...
[is subject to] (1) twice the maximum punishment authorized by section 841(b) ... and
(2) at least twice any term of supervised release authorized by section 841(b) ... for a
first offense.
Id.
216. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. at 571-72.
217. Id. Utilizing the Garcia-Salazar court's interpretation of Lopez, if Congress hypotheti-
cally had added to section 922(q) the words, "with intent to distribute," the statute could have
been upheld by the Court.
218. Id. at 572.
219. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993).
220. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
221. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. at 572.
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the Court in Lopez.22 2 In contrast with the holding in Garcia-
Salazar,22 3 it was the Court's argument in Lopez that the aggregate-
effect doctrine could be applied to any individual activity to support
the finding that the activity substantially affected interstate
commerce.
224
Another case which illustrates a court's desire to find an explicit
congressional purpose where the jurisdictional element was not appar-
ent is United States v. Leshuk.225 In Leshuk, the defendant was
charged with cultivating marijuana in a rural county in West Virginia
in violation of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970.226 The court upheld the constitutionality of the Act
in light of Lopez, concluding that Congress' explicit finding that drug
possession of controlled substances had a substantial and direct effect
upon interstate drug trafficking was controlling.227
3. Jurisdictional Element Present, No Congressional Finding
Courts have taken another approach where the connection of the
regulated activity in the aggregate to interstate commerce is neither
readily apparent nor supported by an express congressional purpose.
These courts have held that the government must satisfy the jurisdic-
tional-element requirement by pointing to the proscribed activity's
substantial effect upon, or connection to, interstate commerce. 228 In
United States v. Pappadopoulos,229 the defendant was convicted of ar-
son of her own house230 and the court was forced to address the issue
222. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1665 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning
the validity of Wickard after the majority posited that there was no limit to Congress' power
using the Wickard "aggregate effects" test).
223. 891 F. Supp. 568 (D. Kan. 1995); see supra notes 213-20 and accompanying text (delineat-
ing the holding of Garcia-Salazar).
224. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's contention that if
the Court deferred to Congress as it had in the past, there would be no limit to Congress' power
to regulate under the Commerce Clause).
225. 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995).
226. Id. at 1107 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994)).
227. Id. at 1112.
228. E.g., United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing a
conviction under a federal arson statute because the government could not uphold its burden of
pointing to a substantial connection between the proscribed arson and interstate commerce).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 524. The statute provides:
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means
of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in
interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, fined the greater of the fine
under this title or the cost of repairing or replacing any property that is damaged or
destroyed [, or both].
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of whether the jurisdictional-element requirement that ensured the
constitutional application of the statute had been met. 231 The govern-
ment attempted to establish the jurisdictional-element requirement by
proving that the Pappadoppoulos' residence was used in interstate
commerce because it received natural gas from out-of-state sources.2 32
The court held that Lopez demonstrated that the receipt of natural
gas at the Pappadopoulos' residence from out-of-state sources was in-
sufficient as a matter of law to confer federal jurisdiction over the in-
dividual case of arson.233 The opinion echoed the resounding cry of
federalism articulated in Lopez, stating that given the importance of
federalism to the nation's scheme of government and its central role in
the preservation of liberty, the courts must zealously preserve the bal-
ance of power between the federal and state governments.2 34
C. Whether the Person or Entity Committing the Prohibited Activity
Was "Engaged in Interstate Commerce"
In cases involving the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tion ("RICO") statute,235 which is based upon Congress' power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause, courts use a different analysis
than that applied in Lopez because one of the RICO requirements is
that the activity of the enterprise affect interstate or foreign com-
merce.236 In the RICO context, courts have held that an enterprise's
minimal effect on interstate commerce is sufficient to support Con-
gress' power to regulate under the Commerce Clause as long as the
enterprise is "engaged in" interstate commerce.237
18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
231. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 527.
232. Id. at 525.
233. Id. at 527 (emphasizing that the residence was not used for commercial activity and was
purely a private residence). The court reasoned that "[i]f the Commerce Clause were extended
to reach the activity that the government seeks to punish here, we would be 'hard-pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."' Id. (quoting
Chief Justice Rehnquist in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995)).
234. Id. at 528 (admonishing the government by declaring that the arson crime was a simple
state crime and should have been tried in state court).
235. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b). To establish a prima facie RICO claim, a civil plaintiff or prosecutor
must allege the existence of seven factors: (1) that the defendant (2) through the commission of
two or more acts (3) constituting a "pattern" (4) of "racketeering activity" (5) directly or indi-
rectly invests in, or maintains an interest in or participates in (6) an "enterprise" (7) the activities
of which affect interstate or foreign commerce. Id.
236. Id.
237. See United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
activities of the Cook County Circuit Court affect interstate commerce simply because the court
purchases supplies and office equipment from companies located outside of Illinois); United
States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding that an arsonist affected interstate
commerce merely because the car that was bombed was insured by an interstate carrier).
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In United States v. Robertson, 38 the Court, in a per curiam opinion
handed down during the same term as Lopez, upheld the defendant's
conviction under RICO.2 39 The Court held that the defendant's Alas-
kan silver mine was "engaged in" interstate commerce since it
purchased out-of-state supplies.2 40
Because the Court did not apply Lopez to Robertson, it is arguable
that the reasoning used in Lopez is not applicable in RICO cases.
This may result in two divergent treatments under the Commerce
Clause. On one hand, under RICO, extremely tenuous connections to
interstate commerce will be sufficient for courts to uphold convictions.
On the other hand, in cases not involving RICO, the courts will need
to scrutinize the activity's connection to commerce more closely.
In United States v. Stillo,241 which was decided by the Seventh Cir-
cuit after Lopez, the defendants, a judge and his nephew, an attorney,
were convicted of conducting and participating in an enterprise (the
Circuit Court of Cook County) through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity that violated RICO.2 42 The defendants argued that Lopez
should control.2 43 However, the Seventh Circuit held that because nu-
merous items were purchased by the firm employing the attorney who
made the bribe, including an out-of-state calculator and will covers,
the general set-up was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the
payment of a bribe might deplete the assets of the firm, thus making it
impossible for the firm to purchase goods and services in interstate
commerce. 244
IV. ANALYSIS
As evidenced by the courts' use of varying methods of analysis in
the wake of Lopez, it would seem that the Lopez decision has caused
confusion in the lower courts. It is the author's position that this con-
fusion is due to the fact that the Court's narrowing of Congress' Com-
merce Clause power in Lopez is doctrinally inconsistent in numerous
ways with the great weight of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The
Court's decision in Lopez invents a threshold inquiry and a new pro-
cedural hurdle to rational basis scrutiny by stating that congressional
findings and a jurisdictional-element requirement may be necessary to
238. 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995).
239. Id. at 1733.
240. Id. at 1732-33.
241. 57 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995).
242. Id. at 556.
243. Id. at 558 n.2 (submitting the Lopez opinion to the Seventh Circuit panel after oral
arguments).
244. Id. at 558.
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determine whether a statute is constitutional.245 Although the Court
disingenuously espoused the use of rational basis scrutiny in striking
down section 922(q), the Lopez decision marks a surprising departure
from true rational basis scrutiny. In inventing its own brand of ra-
tional basis scrutiny, the majority fell into the trap of formalistically
categorizing and summarily dismissing Alphonso Lopez' proscribed
activity as noncommercial. 246 The majority's preoccupation with
whether an activity is "commercial" or "noncommercial" presages the
beginning of a retreat to the abandoned formalistic analysis. Finally,
underlying this newly announced Commerce Clause doctrine lies a
presumption-a presumption of what is truly "national" versus what
is truly "local. '247 Although the rationale of Chief Justice Rehnquist
encompassed federalism ideals, it presupposes what may be catego-
rized as "local" and "national," a task that earlier Court decisions
have proven impossible.248
Before the Lopez decision, the Commerce Clause doctrine was well
settled law. Congress merely had to have a rational basis for conclud-
ing that a proscribed activity sufficiently affected interstate com-
merce.249 After the Lopez decision, which purports to affirm the use
of rational basis scrutiny, 250 the doctrine ends up looking quite differ-
ent than it did prior to Lopez. The Court's opinion is inconsistent
with precedent because the court utilized rational basis scrutiny "with
bite."25'
A. Adding Procedural "Bite" to Rational Basis Scrutiny
Under traditional rational basis scrutiny, the Court has never dis-
cussed jurisdictional-element requirements or explicit congressional
findings. 252 In the Lopez decision, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist
raised two new threshold procedural barriers to upholding statutes
245. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631-32 (1995).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1634.
248. See supra notes 16-110 and accompanying text (providing a historical overview of the
attempts to distinguish "national" and "local" activity).
249. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-80 (1981);
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151-56, (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
250. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628.
251. Gerald Gunther, In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-48 (1972) (explaining the phrase "with bite" to
mean a higher level of scrutiny than mere rational basis scrutiny).
252. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938) (stating that under
the rational basis scrutiny, the Court would sustain regulation in the socioeconomic sphere if any
state of facts either known or reasonably inferable afforded support for the legislative judgment
to forward the general public interest).
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based upon the Commerce Clause. First, the Chief Justice reasoned
that a jurisdictional-element requirement would ensure, through case-
by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession at issue affected interstate
commerce.2 53 Second, when no substantial effect is "visible to the na-
ked eye," Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that congressional findings
would enable the Court to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce.254
1. The Jurisdictional-Element Requirement Argument Is Flawed
To support his theory of a jurisdictional-element requirement, Chief
Justice Rehnquist 255 cited United States v. Bass,256 in which the Court
required an additional nexus between receiving, possessing, and trans-
porting a gun and interstate commerce because the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968257 was ambiguous and because
Congress did not clearly convey its purpose.258 However, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist admitted that the Court in Bass was avoiding the con-
stitutional issue.259  Therefore, the procedural requirement of a
jurisdictional element was merely a method of evading the constitu-
tional question of whether Congress could regulate the possession of
firearms. 260 The jurisdictional-element requirement as formulated by
the Court in Bass was not the doctrinal solution to the constitutional
question and, therefore, should not be relied upon as such.261
In addition, a close reading of the Bass decision reveals that the
Court was primarily influenced by the rule of lenity, a canon of statu-
tory construction which requires that "ambiguity concerning the ambit
of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity. ' '262 Accord-
ing to the Bass decision, the rule of lenity is based on the concept that
criminal punishment is so serious that fair warning should be given by
the legislature.263 However, the Court also stated in Bass that it
253. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
254. Id. at 1632.
255. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion is the only opinion to suggest a
jurisdictional-element requirement, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Thomas, and Scalia seemingly
acquiesce with the Chief Justice on this point because none of them addressed the issue
separately.
256. 404 U.S. 336, 339-47 (1971).
257. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(repealed 1986).
258. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 337-49 (1971).
259. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
260. Bass, 404 U.S. at 339 n.4.
261. Id. at 339.
262. Id. at 347 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
263. Id. at 348.
1997]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
would be "unreal to argue" that there are notice problems under fed-
eral law when a state statute prohibits the same conduct as the federal
law.264 Such was the case in Lopez, where Texas state law also prohib-
ited firearm possession on school premises. 265 Therefore, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's reliance on Bass is seemingly flawed in its application
to Lopez.
An important and unresolved issue is whether the jurisdictional-ele-
ment requirement can be applied to cases other than those involving
criminal statutes. It is at least a colorable argument that the jurisdic-
tional element should only be required in criminal cases given the
Chief Justice's reliance on Bass. There is no support in the Lopez
opinion for extending the requirement to cases involving noncriminal
statutes because the Chief Justice cites only to criminal cases 266 and
the rationale is based upon the rule of lenity which is unique to crimi-
nal cases.
2. The Congressional-Finding Argument Is Novel
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the government that
Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the
burdens an activity has upon interstate commerce, he boldly created
the "visible to the naked eye" test- 267which now triggers the neces-
sity of legislative or congressional committee findings-without citing
support for doing So. 2 6 8 Justice Breyer, in his dissent, disagreed with
Chief Justice Rehnquist's "naked eye" test.269 Indeed, the standard is
novel in light of Katzenbach v. McClung,270 in which the Court held
that although Congress included no formal findings in Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, "their absence is not fatal to the validity of
the statute for the evidence presented at the hearings fully indicated
the nature and effect of the burdens on commerce which Congress
meant to alleviate." 271
264. Id. at 348 n.15.
265. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994).
266. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995). In addition to Bass, Chief Justice
Rehnquist also cited United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 448 (1953) (plurality
opinion).
267. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
268. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
269. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (admitting that Congress did not write specific "inter-
state commerce" findings into 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) under which Lopez was convicted but empha-
sizing that findings were never required).
270. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
271. Id. at 304 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)); see, e.g.,
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (validating a statute which set a quota for the
production of wheat intended wholly for home consumption because Congress may properly
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Similarly, in Lopez, there was evidence presented at the hearings
regarding the Gun-Free School Zones Act to support a substantial ef-
fect on interstate commerce. At a Senate hearing on the Gun-Free
School Zones Act before the Subcommittee on Crime and the Judici-
ary Committee, the police chief of Cleveland, Ohio, testified, "We
have identified gang members coming from Los Angeles, Chicago,
Detroit, and other areas of the country, coming into the Cleveland
area and trying to organize our gangs .... We have reason to believe
that they are also supplying them with weapons. ' '272 The police chief
testified that gang members brought weapons into Ohio from other
states and asked Congress to help solve the problem. 273 There is no
doubt that Congress, after considering the police chief's testimony,
had a rational basis to conclude that the class of activity-possession
of a firearm on school premises-substantially affected the interstate
commerce.
More notable is the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist did not and
could not rely on Perez v. United States274 or Preseault v. ICC,275 two
Commerce Clause cases in which the Court explicitly mentioned reli-
ance on findings, to support his "visible to the naked eye" test.276 In
Perez, although the Court looked to congressional findings that intra-
state, extortionate credit transactions affected interstate commerce,
the Court specifically stated that it did not mean "to infer that Con-
gress need make particularized findings in order to legislate. '277 In
Preseault, a unanimous Court stated that it "must defer to a congres-
sional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce 'if
there is any rational basis for such a finding." 278 However, although
the statute and committee reports were devoid of findings or even a
have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown would have a substantial effect
in obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade).
272. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 8 (1990) (statement of Edward Kovacic).
273. Id.; see also United States v. Omelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Colo. 1994) (relying on
Edward Kovacic's testimony as providing a rational basis for Congress to regulate guns in
schools). But see Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Chief Justice Rehnquist stating that "[tihe posses-
sion of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through
repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce").
274. 402 U.S. 146, 155 (1971).
275. 494 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1990).
276. For a discussion of the congressional findings as they relate to Commerce Clause cases,
see James M. Maloney, Note, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress: The Constitutionality of
Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795, 1817-32 (1994).
277. Perez, 402 U.S. at 156.
278. Preseault, 494 U.S. at 17 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981).
1997]
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mention of the Commerce Clause, 279 the Court held that the history of
Congress' attempts to address the problem provided sufficient reason
to defer to Congress' judgment that the statute addressed the problem
at hand.280 If the rationale of the Court in Preseault was applied to
Lopez, Congress' history of creating laws to prohibit possession of
firearms2 81 should have triggered deference to Congress' judgment to
enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act.282
In his dissent, Justice Breyer 283 strongly questioned the new re-
quirement of a congressional finding.284 He did so in light of the fact
that the majority supposedly reaffirmed using rational basis scru-
tiny,285 which asks whether Congress could have had a rational basis
for so concluding that the regulated activity had a sufficient effect
upon interstate commerce. 286 Therefore, the procedural requirement
of congressional findings was also utilized to add substantively more
"bite" to rational basis scrutiny. Because there is no precedent for
requiring such findings, it seems that the addition of the new proce-
dural requirements "plows new ground and represents a sharp break
with the long-standing pattern" of Commerce Clause cases.287
279. National Trails System Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-11 §§ 208-09, 97 Stat. 48 (1983);
S. REP. No. 98-1, at 9-10 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 98-28, at 8-9 (1983); Reply Brief for the United
States, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260) (LEXIS, Genfed Library,
Briefs File).
280. Preseault, 494 U.S. at 19 (holding that the National Trails System Act amendments were
constitutional under the Commerce Clause).
281. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994) (making it unlawful for anyone to knowingly vio-
late the Brady Act, which mandates law-enforcement officers to make reasonable efforts within
five business days to ascertain whether receipt or possession of a handgun by a prospective buyer
would be in violation of the law); id. § 922(o)(1) (making it unlawful for any person to transfer
or possess a machine-gun); see also Ronald A. Giller, Note, Federal Gun Control in the United
States: Revival of the Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 151 (1994) (analyz-
ing constitutional problems encountered by recent federal gun control legislation).
282. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A).
283. Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Jus-
tice Ginsburg. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1657 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 1658.
285. Id. at 1629.
286. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
287. This is the same language that the Fifth Circuit used to strike down the Gun-Free School
Zones Act. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1366 (1993); see Official Transcript of Oral
Argument, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (No. 93-1260), 1994 WL 758950, at *34
(stating from the bench that "[w]e're making up this procedural requirement, anyway. ...
(Laughter.)").
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B. Adding Substantive "Bite" to Rational Basis Scrutiny: A Little
Formalism Goes a Long Way
The majority's rationale in Lopez increased the level at which the
Court scrutinized the statute in question and utilized three formalistic
doctrines to strike down the law. First, Chief Justice Rehnquist cate-
gorized the activities which Congress is permitted to regulate or pro-
tect.288 Second, he determined whether the activity was "commercial"
or "noncommercial. '289 Finally, the Chief Justice acted on the pre-
sumption that it is possible to discern what constitutes a "national"
concern as opposed to a "local" concern.290 The misguided use of
these three tests throughout the majority opinion only serves to en-
hance the confusion caused by the Lopez decision.
1. The Hasty Disposal of a Category of Permissible Legislation
Chief Justice Rehnquist lists three categories of activity that Con-
gress may regulate under its Commerce Clause power,2 91 but he
"quickly disposed" of the first two.292 The second category that was
disregarded included Congress' power to regulate and protect persons
or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities. 293 A closer look at the second cate-
gory, however, reveals that the Gun-Free School Zones Act could
have also fit within its parameters.
Alphonso Lopez carried a .38-caliber handgun to school with him in
order to deliver it to another individual for forty dollars.2 94 Although
288. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
289. Id. at 1630-31.
290. Id. at 1634.
291. Id. at 1629. The three categories were first raised using the "affecting commerce" stan-
dard instead of the "substantially affecting commerce" standard in Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
292. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of inter-
state commerce. Id. (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 150). Second, Congress is empowered to regulate
and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate com-
merce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activity. Id. Third, Congress'
commerce power includes the authority to regulate those activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce. Id.
293. Id. (citing Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) as an example); see
United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 686-87 (7th Cir. 1995) (analyzing in depth the second cate-
gory, which provides that Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activity).
294. Mr. Lopez stated that he was to receive forty dollars for delivering the weapon. Brief for




this was mentioned in the petitioner's and respondent's briefs,295 it
was never mentioned in the majority opinion. This is seemingly due
to the fact that the majority refused to recognize Congress' ability to
rationally find that regulation of gun possession was necessary to reg-
ulate interstate gun trafficking.296
In addition, according to the definition of "firearm" in the Gun-
Free School Zones Act, a firearm also includes its subcomponents,
such as its receiver and frame, 297 meaning that its subcomponents
could also be considered "things" in interstate commerce. Utilizing
traditional rational basis scrutiny, the Lopez case could easily have
been placed into Chief Justice Rehnquist's second category rather
than the third category. 298 This is a colorable argument because other
federal criminal statutes controlling solely intrastate possession have
been upheld based upon the rationale that Congress rationally could
have concluded that controlling intrastate possession was necessary to
control interstate trafficking. 299
By treating the three categories as separate tests and by applying
rational basis scrutiny "with bite," Chief Justice Rehnquist divided
and conquered. The strategy quickly and effectively excluded Lopez
from the second category by refusing to defer to Congress' conclusion
that the guns were things in commerce, thereby stripping the argu-
ment down to just one prong.300 In one fell swoop, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's selection of the third category created a diversion which
masked his crucial decision to use rational basis scrutiny "with bite" in
balancing Congress' desired ends and means.
2. Commercial Versus Noncommercial Activity
The Justices who composed the majority in Lopez emphasized the
commerce versus noncommerce dichotomy in their rationales.301
295. Id.; Brief of Respondent, United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1524 (1995) (No. 93-1260)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
296. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (noting the majority's refusal to defer to
Congress' judgment concerning the effect of guns in schools on interstate commerce).
297. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (1994).
298. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 686 (7th Cir. 1995) (chastising the district
court for dismissing the second category without discussion).
299. See United States v. Atkinson, 513 F.2d 38, 40 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that Congress
could regulate narcotics, including intrastate narcotics possession, to regulate effectively the in-
terstate trafficking in narcotics).
300. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 (1995).
301. In his dissent, Justice Souter criticized the majority for this formalism by stating that "the
Court treats deference under the rationality rule as subject to gradation according to the com-
mercial or noncommercial nature of the immediate subject of the challenged regulation." Id. at
1653 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer stated that "the Court
believes the Constitution would distinguish between two local activities, each of which has an
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Although Chief Justice Rehnquist repeatedly referred to the com-
merce/noncommerce dichotomy, he never defined "commercial" or
"economic" activity.302 Similarly, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
O'Connor, failed to define commerce in his concurring opinions, yet
he argued for an even stricter adherence to the commerce/noncom-
merce dichotomy. 30 3 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas de-
fined "commerce" and even suggested total reliance on this
categorical test.3°4 While each Justice offered his or her own unique
approach to formalism, the end result is that all of the Justices in the
majority perceived gun possession in schools as entirely "outside" the
realm of activities which could be considered commercial or
economic.
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, because possession of a gun
in school may not be considered commercial behavior, Congress may
not regulate it.3°5 While Chief Justice Rehnquist did not offer a defi-
nition for commerce, he apparently took an "I know it when I see
it"306 approach and gun possession did not fit his conception of
commerce.
Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist's most notable statement from Lo-
pez was that "[s]ection 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,
however broadly one might define those terms. ' 30 7 The presumption
underlying this statement is that if one were to identify a common
thread running through criminal cases under the Commerce Clause, it
would be that the activity being regulated was deemed commercial in
nature. Hence, since the possession of a gun in Lopez was not com-
identical effect upon interstate commerce, if one, but not the other is 'commercial' in nature."
Id. at 1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But see United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir.
1995) (arguing that the dissent in Lopez misread the majority's discussion of commerce as de-
lineating the substantial-effects test).
302. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626-34.
303. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text (outlining Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion).
304. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas' concurring
opinion).
305. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. As Justice Souter stated in his dissent:
The distinction between what is patently commercial and what is not looks much like
the old distinction between what directly affects commerce and what touches it only
indirectly. And the act of calibrating the level of deference by drawing a line between
what is patently commercial and what is less purely so will probably resemble the pro-
cess of deciding how much interference with contractual freedom was fatal.
Id. at 1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
306. The "I know it when I see it" phrase was coined by Justice Stewart in his concurrence in
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing hard-core por-
nography and the limit of both federal and state power to regulate it).
307. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
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mercial in nature, Lopez was distinguishable. There are, however, nu-
merous cases in which the Court upheld criminal statutes under the
Commerce Clause without regard to the proscribed behavior being
commercial. 30 8 Therefore, the logical underpinning supporting the
majority's commerce/noncommerce categorization appears unsound.
In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist's determination of whether an
intrastate activity was commercial or noncommercial disregarded the
line of Commerce Clause cases that emphasized the practical, substan-
tial effects of the activity on interstate commerce. 309 As early as 1905
in Swift & Co. v. United States310 and 1922 in Stafford v. Wallace,311 the
Court looked at the pragmatic effects of the regulated activity at issue
on interstate commerce.312 This approach was also implemented by
the Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ,313 United States v.
Darby,314 Wickard v. Filburn,315 and Katzenbach v. McClung.31 6 The
majority's categorization of activity as commerce was diametrically
opposed to the practical effect analysis espoused by these cases be-
cause the Lopez majority's formalistic test used a subjective, as op-
308. See Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 n.6 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994), and citing as examples: Russell v.
United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) which penalizes
"[wihoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire
or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in ... any activity
affecting interstate or foreign commerce") and Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960)
(upholding the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which criminally penalizes, "[w]hoever in any way
or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce, by robbery or extortion ... or [by] commit[ting] or threaten[ing] physical violence to
any person or property")); see also Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Com-
merce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 563-64
(1995) (discussing Justice Breyer's mischaracterization of the precedent of Katzenbach, Daniel,
and Perez).
309. See Regan, supra note 308, at 564.
310. 196 U.S. 375, 398-401 (1905); see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing
Swift).
311. 258 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1922); see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing
Stafford).
312. See supra notes 53-68 and accompanying text (discussing the "close and substantial" test
and the "current of commerce" test).
313. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (stating that when a constant practice threatens to obstruct or to
unduly burden the freedom of interstate commerce it is within the regulatory power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause).
314. 312 U.S. 100, 117 (1941) (stating that manufacturing may be regulated if, during the nor-
mal course of business, the manufactured products may be shipped interstate).
315. 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (discussing how farmer Filburn's consumption of home-
grown wheat practically affects the market price of wheat).
316. 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (explaining how a restaurant's refusal to serve African-
Americans has the practical effect of burdening the interstate of food and other products).
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posed to an objective, analysis. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Breyer repeated Justice Jackson's warning in Wickard:317
We believe that a review of the course of decision under the Com-
merce Clause will make plain, however, that questions of the power
of Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula
which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as "pro-
duction" and "indirect" and foreclose consideration of the actual
effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce. 318
In response to Justice Breyer's recantation of Justice Jackson's
warning in Wickard, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is com-
mercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncer-
tainty. But, so long as Congress' authority is limited to those
powers enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enu-
merated powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable
outer limits, congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause
always will engender "legal uncertainty. '319
The fact that there will always be uncertainty, however, is not a con-
vincing argument for reverting to formalism. This is especially true
given the fact that such formalism has long since been criticized as
being unworkable and unpractical. 320 More importantly, because
Chief Justice Rehnquist refused to define "commerce," the division
between commercial and noncommercial activity is not only elusive, it
is logistically impossible.
Justices Kennedy unabashedly stated in his concurring opinion that
"Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption
that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable
national economy."' 321 He also opined that stare decisis "mandate[d]
against returning to the time when congressional authority to regulate
undoubted commercial activities was limited by a judicial determina-
tion that those matters had an insufficient connection to an interstate
system. ' 322 Therefore, according to Justices Kennedy, anything
deemed to be "commerce" may be regulated by Congress-no matter
how private the activity and no matter how insubstantial the effect on
317. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1663 (1995); see supra notes 101-10 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Wickard).
318. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120.
319. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
320. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120; see supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text (discussing
Wickard).




interstate commerce. 323 However, if the activity is not "commerce,"
then it is within the province of the Court to decide whether Congress
had any right to regulate the activity. Unfortunately, like Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy failed to define "commerce" or pre-
sumed that it was a term so easily defined that it needed no
clarification. Such a presumption is unwarranted given the difficulty
of past courts to define exactly what constitutes "commerce. '324
Unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, Justice
Thomas recommended going two steps further in constructing a com-
merce/noncommerce doctrine. First, Justice Thomas went to the
trouble of defining "commerce. '325 Second, he recommended the re-
consideration of the "substantial effects" test and the implementation
of a more coherent categorical test.326
According to Justice Thomas, although "case law has drifted far
from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause[,]" 327 the
meaning of "commerce" was cast at the time the original Constitution
was ratified.328 Commerce means "selling, buying, and bartering, as
well as transporting for these purposes. '329 Under Justice Thomas'
paradigm, agriculture and manufacturing would not be included in
that definition.330
Therefore, utilizing Justice Thomas' test, it is arguable that the stat-
utes in Wickard v. Filburn,331 which regulated agriculture, and NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ,332 which regulated manufacturing,
would not have been upheld. When applied, Justice Thomas' test is
strikingly similar to the direct/indirect test utilized in United States v.
323. See Regan, supra note 308, at 565-66 (interpreting Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lo-
pez to mean that as long as Congress is regulating commercial behavior, the Court need not
consider effects on interstate commerce at all).
324. See supra notes 16-110 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the Commerce
Clause history in its attempt to define "commerce").
325. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642-43 (Thomas, J., concurring); see supra notes 153-60 and accom-
panying text (outlining Justice Thomas' concurring opinion).
326. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1643.
329. Id. (citing 1 S. JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 361 (4th ed. 1773),
N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (26th ed. 1789), T. SHERI-
DAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1796), and 3 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 1989)).
330. Id. Justice Thomas noted that "the term 'commerce' was used in contradistinction to
productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture." Id.
331. 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text (outlining the ration-
ale of Wickard).
332. 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (discussing Jones &
Laughlin Steel and the manufacturing regulations).
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E.C. Knight Co.,3 3 3 Hammer v. Dagenhart,334 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 335 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 336 since manu-
facturing and agriculture were not deemed "commerce."
Likewise, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,337 the statute in question in
Katzenbach v. McClung,338 would also be struck down using Justice
Thomas' test because it did not regulate the sale, purchase, or barter
of goods or the transportation of goods for the purpose of sale,
purchase, or barter; it merely prohibited discrimination in restaurants.
To Justice Thomas, it did not matter whether a regulated activity had a
substantial effect on commerce. 339 All that mattered was that the ac-
tivity fit the definition of commerce. 340
Although Justice Thomas' test may be easier to apply, the Court has
rarely sacrificed stability for the sake of simplicity. The adoption of
Justice Thomas' interpretation of the "original understanding" of the
Commerce Clause would essentially nullify over sixty years of Com-
merce Clause decisions.341 This is more than merely "reconsidering"
the substantial effects test.
Justice Thomas also suggested a wholesale diminishment of Con-
gress' power under the Commerce Clause and that cannot be done
"without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. '342 It is in reaction to Justice Thomas' own view of the "origi-
nal understanding" of the Commerce Clause that Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor declared that "the Court as an institution and the legal
system as a whole have an immense stake in the stability of our Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point. ' 343 How-
333. 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text (analyzing E.C. Knight).
334. 247 U.S. 251 (1918); see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing Hammer
and its direct/indirect test).
335. 295 U.S. 495 (1934); see supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (analyzing Schechter).
336. 298 U.S. 238 (1936); see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussing Carter).
337. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994).
338. 379 U.S. 294 (1964); see supra note 180 and accompanying text (delineating the holding
of McClung).
339. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1650 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas denounced the "substantial effects" test as being of "recent vintage" and "flawed." Id.
340. Id. Justice Thomas defended his position by noting that "[e]ven though the boundary
between commerce and other matters may ignore 'economic reality' and thus seem arbitrary or
artificial to some, we must nevertheless respect a constitutional line that does not grant Congress
power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce." Id. at 1646.
341. Justice Thomas argued that his original understanding discussion did not require a
"wholesale abandonment" of recent opinions because he recognized considerations of stare deci-
sis and reliance interests. Id.
342. Id. at 1642-43.
343. Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated that stare decisis prevents
the Court from "reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18th-
century economy" and "mandates against returning to the time when congressional authority to
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ever, this chastising is a bit disingenuous considering that the majority
resorted to modified doctrines inconsistent with established Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence in order to strike down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act.
By concentrating on what constitutes commerce and what does not,
the Justices promoted a technical conception of commerce rather than
a practical one, a methodology that was denounced by Justice Holmes
in Swift & Co. v. United States.344 This formalistic methodology forces
judges to subjectively sketch arbitrary and artificial lines between
what is deemed "commerce" and what is not.345 Moreover, this sub-
jective line drawing will, no doubt, be guided and driven by each
judge's individual concept of federalism.
3. National Versus Local Activity
Instead of adhering to precedent and asking whether Congress
could have reasonably concluded that gun possession affects interstate
commerce, the majority treated the issue as whether a judicial nod
would signify the end of the division of two allegedly mutually exclu-
sive realms: local and national activity.346 After Lopez, the distinc-
tion between "national" and "local" activity is critical in analyzing the
constitutionality of laws based upon the Commerce Clause power. If
the proscribed activity is considered traditionally local and is not cate-
gorized as commerce, the federal statute will be struck down regard-
less of whether Congress had a rational basis to conclude that the
activity substantially affected commerce. 347
Emphasizing federalism 348 ideals, the majority defined what is "na-
tional" and what is "local" by implementing a "test of conse-
regulate undoubted commercial activities was limited by a judicial determination that those mat-
ters had an insufficient connection to an interstate system." Id.
344. 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905); see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing Swift);
see also Regan, supra note 308, at 564 (arguing that Chief Justice Rehnquist offered an unaccept-
able gloss on existing doctrine).
345. See Deborah J. Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 742-45 (1995) (arguing that
the Lopez Court utilized "fuzzy logic" to determine the "commerce-likeness" of an activity).
346. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633-34. Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that if the Court gave
deference to Congress there would never be a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local. Id.
347. Id.; see Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States v. Lopez: The New Hybrid
Commerce Clause, 34 Duo. L. REV. 1, 31 (1995) (stating that judicial review after Lopez is more
demanding).
348. Federalism is the "[t]erm which includes interrelationships among the states and relation-
ship between the states and the federal government." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed.
1990); see MARTIN H. REDIsH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 23-61 (1995) (dis-
cussing federalism, the Constitution, and American political theory); Harry N. Scheiber, Federal-
ism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 278-87
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quences. '349 The test asked whether a hypothetical statute in the
future could ever be struck down using the chain of causality offered
by the government in Lopez. 350 The majority's use of this test to de-
fine traditionally "national" and "local" activities is inappropriate be-
cause the test is based upon mere speculation. In addition, by
focusing solely on future decisions, the Court's test ignores present
realities and past decisions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's view that any hypothetical statute would
be upheld utilizing the dissent's chain of causality presumes that there
are no other limits to Congress' power to legislate other than the lan-
guage of the Commerce Clause. 351 As Justice Blackmun stated in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,352 "behind the
words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and
control. ' 353 According to Justice Blackmun, in addition to the Consti-
tution, the basic structure of the federal government controls what
Congress may or may not regulate.354 The states' role in the political
process provides the necessary protection of the states' interests. 355
In essence, the majority's "test of consequences" assumes that legis-
lators in Congress will not be responsive to the needs of citizens of the
states who elect them into office. However, using the same cynical
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds. 1992) (providing an excellent and concise history of federalism and the
Court); WILLIAM H. STEWART, CONCEPTS OF FEDERALISM 29-177 (1984) (providing an exhaus-
tive list of different concepts of federalism, their origin, and a detailed description).
349. Though the Court does not use the phrase "test of consequences," one analyst has
termed Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis as such. H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and
Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REV. 651, 656 (1995). Powell articulated the test of consequences
as follows:
[I]f the argument that must be made to justify a particular statute leaves one unable to
hypothesize any piece of legislation that Congress could not lawfully enact under the
same reasoning, the argument and the statute stand self-condemned as invalid attempts
to ignore the principle of enumerated and limited federal power.
Id. at 655.
350. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's refusal to defer
to Congress).
351. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: "To uphold the Government's contentions here, we
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by
the States." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
352. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act stating that the principal
limit on the federal commerce power is the states' participation in the political system).
353. Id. at 547 (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934)).
354. Id. at 550-51.
355. Id. at 551-52. "[T]he National political process... and especially the role of the states in
the composition and selection of the central government-is intrinsically well adapted to retard-
ing or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the states." Herbert Weschler,
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of
the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954).
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presumption, it is arguable that the state legislators will be equally
negligent in responding to the needs of their constituents. Therefore,
some states will choose not to ban guns in schools,356 despite the fact
that guns are coming into the schools via gang members from other
areas of the country357 and despite citizens' concerns that gun-related
violence in schools is depriving their children of a quality education
and the ability to succeed in the work force.358 The Lopez decision
signifies the Court's willingness to set affirmative limits on Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause without analyzing the practical
effect that some states may never respond to those very same state
citizens who elect their representatives in Congress.359
Another criticism of the majority's ex ante perspective is that what
may or could happen in the future is uncertain and, therefore, it is
faulty reasoning to treat unknown factors as known factors.360 Chief
Justice Rehnquist utilized this reasoning when he stated that under
the dissent's chain of causality, family law, which has traditionally
been regulated by the states, could be directly regulated by Congress
356. Forty states have laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds.
Therefore, ten states do not have such laws. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1641 (citing as examples,
ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.195(a)(2)(A), 11.61.220(a)(4)(A) (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9
(West 1994); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 269, § 100) (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5(e) (West Supp.
1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (Michie 1988); Wis. STAT. § 948.605 (1991-1992)). In the
area of crime control, the states have not opposed the use of the Commerce Clause as an expan-
sive basis for federal intervention. Tracy W. Resch, The Scope of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
Under the Commerce Clause, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 805, 822 (1972). State acquiescence is attributa-
ble to the following fact:
[T]he federal government has not preempted state powers; federal intervention has
helped states deal with problems serious enough to override the usual states' rights
fears; and the federal government has entered this area gradually, reluctantly, and pri-
marily with programs aimed at organized crime, a problem generally felt to be incapa-
ble of solution by the states acting alone.
Id.
357. See supra notes 267-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Lopez Court's flawed reli-
ance on congressional findings).
358. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining how guns in schools
substantially affects the quality of education which is inextricably entwined with the nation's
economy).
359. Id. at 1633 (declining to expand Congress' Commerce Clause power). However, Justice
Breyer opined that holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act as within the commerce power
would acknowledge that the "commerce clause does not operate so as to render the nation pow-
erless to defend itself against economic forces that Congress decrees inimical or destructive of
the national economy." Id. at 1662 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing North American Co. v. SEC,
327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946)).
360. The majority's viewpoint may be described as that of a pragmatist. "The pragmatist
thinks judges should always do the best they can for the future, in the circumstances, unchecked
by any need to respect or secure consistency in principle with what other officials have done or
will do." RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 161 (1986).
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in the future. 361 The concrete facts of the specific case, the rationale
of Congress, and the statutory language regarding a federal family law
(all of which are important considerations) are simply nonexistent.
Therefore, it is difficult to argue with Chief Justice Rehnquist's rea-
soning, not because it is so powerful and true to the text of the Consti-
tution, but because it is grounded in possibilities, not actualities. 362
After all, merely because something is possible does not make it rea-
sonably probable.
The dissenting opinions did not succumb to reliance on possibilities.
Instead, the dissent was grounded in practicality. The dissent empha-
sized that gun-related school violence affects commerce in a very real
sense. 363 Justice Breyer addressed known factors, such as reports and
studies which documented the connection between gun-related vio-
lence in schools and its effect on the quality of education and inter-
state commerce.364 For example, Justice Breyer stated that in any six-
month period, several hundred-thousand school children are victims
of violent crimes in or near their schools and that school violence is
linked to drop-out rates.365 Justice Breyer also argued that function-
ally and technologically illiterate Americans in the work force erode
our economic standing in the international marketplace. 366 In addi-
tion, Justice Stevens explained that the market for the possession of
handguns by school-age children is substantial. 367 By concentrating
on the actual effects of gun possession on interstate commerce rather
than the possibility that other statutes in the future will be upheld
using the same rationale, the dissent permits Congress to act in terms
of "economic realities" 368 and according to well accepted precedent,
361. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
362. Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1984), argued that "[tlhe process of Constitutional adjudication does not thrive on
conjuring up horrible possibilities that never happen in the real world and devising doctrines
sufficiently comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest contingency." Id. at 556 (citing New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946)). Justice Blackmun therefore refused to identify
the affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose upon federal action affecting the
states under the Commerce Clause. Id.
363. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (noting Justice Breyer's reliance on statistics
of the effect of gun-related violence in schools on commerce).
364. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer mentioned that dur-
ing the nation's economic boon, "investment in 'human capital,' (through spending on educa-
tion) exceeded investment in 'physical capital' by a ratio of almost two to one." Id. at 1660
(citation omitted).
365. Id. at 1659.
366. Id. at 1660.
367. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that there is evidence that
firearm manufacturers target school children as consumers by distributing hunting-related videos
in the guise of educational materials. Id. at 1651 n.*.
368. Id. at 1662 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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and not in terms of hypothetical situations or unprincipled definitions
of "local" or "national" activities.
V. IMPACT
Lopez is a pebble that has been thrown into a still pond, sending
ripples to the mossy edges. Only time will tell whether that pebble
will be followed by a boulder. 369 Lopez is a significant case because it
indicates that the Court will not readily defer to Congress to regulate
under the Commerce Clause unless it sees proof that Congress found
justification in enacting a law. However, an outline of the new para-
digm under the Commerce Clause after Lopez demonstrates that it is
still very easy to avoid the invalidation of statutes.
A. The Invalidation of Statutes After Lopez
The most efficient way to strike down a statute after Lopez is for a
court to declare that the regulated activity has nothing to do with
commerce. 370 The following template will be used by courts to invali-
date statutes after Lopez. After finding that the proscribed activity is
not an instrumentality of commerce or a person or thing in commerce,
a judge may merely determine whether the activity has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 371 Under this template, jurisdictional
elements are necessary for criminal statutes and arguably optional for
other statutes. 372 A judge, using his or her own definition (or Justice
Thomas' definition) of what is "commercial" or "economic," will then
state that the activity is not commerce and will strike down the law as
having an insufficient impact upon interstate commerce. This is per-
haps the most disturbing effect of Lopez in that the invalidation of the
law primarily hinges on the judge's individual definition of
commerce.
373
369. "Not every epochal case has come in epochal trappings." Id. at 1657.
370. See, e.g., id. at 1630-31 (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act stating that the
proscribed activity had nothing to do with commerce); United States v. Pappadopoulous, No. 93-
10577, 1995 WL 502907, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 1995) (stating that the residence subject to arson
was not used at all for commercial activity).
371. See, e.g., United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (D. Ariz. 1995) (striking down
the Child Support Recovery Act and asserting that the statute was aimed at an area of activity
not substantially related to interstate commerce).
372. See supra notes 255-66 and accompanying text (discussing the new jurisdictional-element
requirement).
373. See supra notes 301-45 and accompanying text (analyzing the new commerce/noncom-
merce dichotomy).
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Next, if there are congressional findings, the judge will state that the
court need not always defer to findings.374 If there are no findings, the
judge may mention their absence but can assert that findings are not
required. 375
Finally, a judge will emphasize that federalism concerns now play
an important role in the Commerce Clause analysis.376 Under the
"test of consequences," the judge may declare that federalism as soci-
ety knows it would be obliterated if the court upheld the law.377 The
court will therefore conclude that the statute must be invalid as being
beyond Congress' power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
B. The Validation of Statutes After Lopez
The easiest way for a court to uphold a statute after Lopez is to
emphasize that rational basis scrutiny is still the appropriate standard,
even after the Lopez decision.378 A court may use the existence of a
jurisdictional element to distinguish Lopez from the statute at hand.379
In addition, if applicable, a court may use the existence of an explicit
congressional finding to distinguish Lopez.380 In either situation, a
court may defer to Congress' superior ability to assess the need for
federal regulation of the activity or conduct in question. 38' Further, a
court may try to fit the activity or conduct under Justice Rehnquist's
second category: things or people in commerce or channels of
commerce.
382
If a court cannot use any of the aforementioned strategies to avoid
the "substantial effects" doctrine, it is arguable that the court may still
be able to uphold the law if the causal chain is not too attenuated.
Thus, the court will apply the "test of consequences" and assert that
the succinct causal chain satisfies the direct-causality requirement
which prevents Congress from being able to regulate all conduct. Fi-
374. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971). "Congress need [not] make
particularized findings in order to legislate." Id.
375. See supra notes 267-87 and accompanying text (criticizing the majority's emphasis on
congressional findings).
376. See supra notes 346-68 and accompanying text (discussing federalism concerns); see, e.g.,
Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1364-65 (emphasizing principles of federalism and comity).
377. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1364.
378. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 1995).
379. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text (analyzing post-Lopez cases which discuss
a jurisdictional-element requirement).
380. See supra notes 211-27 and accompanying text (discussing post-Lopez decisions address-
ing congressional findings).
381. Id.
382. See supra notes 191-201 and accompanying text (analyzing post-Lopez cases which cate-
gorize activity as "things in commerce").
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nally, the court may declare that the law is a valid exercise of Con-
gress' power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
The Lopez decision created a major change in the Court's evalua-
tion process. Other than effecting this change, the impact of Lopez
has not been monumental3 83 due to an understandable reluctance of
courts to abandon the previous paradigm which lasted over sixty
years. 384 Therefore, the effect of Lopez thus far has not thwarted
Congress' jurisdiction over interstate commerce but has promoted ju-
dicial and congressional discourse regarding Congress' justifications
for exercising its legislative power. Now that jurisdictional elements
are required, the next dispute will be over whether explicit congres-
sional findings are required in a federal law based upon the Com-
merce Clause.
CONCLUSION
The nationalization and globalization of commerce in the United
States puts the scope of the Commerce Clause on a collision course
with state sovereignty over traditionally local matters. Finding a well
principled test to define a "traditionally" local matter, however, has
eluded the United States Supreme Court for over a century. As Jus-
tice Blackmun once said, the "traditional nature of a particular gov-
ernmental function can be a matter of historical nearsightedness" 385
and "today's self-evidently 'traditional' function is often yesterday's
suspect innovation. '386 As long as the Court continues to recognize
procedural protections (that is, the jurisdictional-element require-
ment) and to uphold rational basis scrutiny, the Court is preventing a
return to the day when judges engaged in pernicious categorical bal-
ancing to determine the scope of the commerce power and cast aside
Congress' expertise and knowledge. However, if rational basis scru-
tiny is repudiated and a heightened scrutiny is employed, the Court
will, no doubt, submerse itself into another dark age of formalism.
Lisa Yumi Gillette
383. See Merritt, supra note 345, at 712-13 (emphasizing that Lopez has not resulted in many
successful constitutional challenges based upon the Commerce Clause).
384. See supra notes 101-16 and accompanying text (analyzing Wickard and its progeny).
385. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544 (1985).
386. Id.
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